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Resumen 
Este documento analiza el efecto de los choques en la oferta de créditos sobre la actividad económica real 
de los países de la Alianza del Pacífico. El enfoque econométrico es un VAR con parámetros cambiantes 
en el tiempo con volatilidad estocástica (TVP-VAR-SV), que se identifica mediante restricciones de signos. 
Los resultados de un estadístico de traza, t-tests y la prueba de Kolmogorov-Smirnov revelan la existencia 
de cambios significativos en la distribución de los parámetros a lo largo del tiempo, lo que respalda el uso 
de parámetros variantes en el tiempo. Los resultados indican que los choques en la oferta de créditos tienen 
un impacto importante en la actividad económica real en todos los países de la Alianza del Pacífico: 
alrededor del 1% en Colombia, México y Perú, y alrededor del 0.5% en Chile. Además, los choques de la 
oferta de créditos tienen un papel considerable en la conducción de las fluctuaciones del ciclo económico, 
no solo en períodos de crisis, sino también en períodos de estabilidad. Su contribución al crecimiento del 
PIB es mayor que la de los choques de oferta agregada y tan alta como la de la demanda agregada y los 
choques dela política monetaria. La evolución del impacto de los choques en la oferta de créditos sobre la 
actividad económica real muestra evidencia de heterogeneidad entre países, lo que refleja diferentes 
estructuras financieras entre los países de la Alianza del Pacífico. Además, al evaluar los efectos en 
diferentes medidas de la actividad económica, se estima que los choques de la oferta crediticia tienen un 
mayor impacto en la demanda interna, mientras que el impacto es similar cuando se estima el modelo para 
las actividades no primarias. Finalmente, el análisis de sensibilidad indica que los resultados del modelo 
son robustos para diferentes especificaciones previas, para diferentes medidas de variables externas y para 
múltiples conjuntos de restricciones de signos. Además, al aplicar una identificación agnóstica, los 
resultados indican que aun dejando libre la respuesta del PIB, su respuesta a los choques del suministro de 
créditos sigue siendo positiva y significativa. Con esta especificación múltiple, el impacto de los choques 
en la oferta de créditos sobre el crecimiento del PBI oscila entre 0.8% y 1.2% en Perú y Colombia, y entre 
0.5% y 0.8% en Chile. Estos resultados están cerca de la estimación de referencia y muestran robustez. Con 
respecto a México, se estima que el impacto de los choques en la oferta de créditos varía entre 0.8% -3.5%. 
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic literature has focused mostly on credit markets as a propagation channel for shocks.
In this context, nancial intermediaries have a passive role in the economy, implying that they only
transmit macroeconomic shocks originating in other sectors, such as aggregate demand shocks or
monetary policy shocks. However, the recent nancial crisis highlighted the importance of credit
markets not only as a transmission mechanism, but also as a source of shocks that may drive
business cycle uctuations.
Recent work on both the theoretical and empirical fronts emphasizes the role of nancial inter-
mediaries as a source of shocks dened as loan supply shocks. In the eld of theoretical research,
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), Gerali et al. (2010), and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) as-
sess the role of loan supply shocks on economic activity by introducing banks explicitly in DSGE
models; and suggest that such shocks have real e¤ects. On the other hand, empirical literature,
by applying sign restrictions to identify credit supply shocks (Bean et al., 2010; De Nicoló and
Lucchetta, 2011; Busch et al., 2010, Helbling et al., 2011; Hristov et al., 2012), or by employing
survey methodologies (Bassett, et al., 2014), show that loan supply shocks have signicant e¤ects
on real economic activity.
Nevertheless, this literature focuses on countries where banking operations have stabilized after
a period of accelerated development, and capital markets have taken on a greater role as a source
of funds. In this context, loan supply shocks may account partially for the impact from nancial
markets, but may not be the main contributor. For this reason, in order to shed light about the
importance of shocks arising from the nancial sector, this research assesses the e¤ects of loan
supply shocks in economies where the banking sector is the main source of funds. In particular,
the countries under study are Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru; i.e., the members of the Pacic
Alliance (PA) bloc. Unlike other economies, there is no previous literature analyzing the e¤ects of
loan supply shocks in PA countries. Furthermore, in order to provide a richer quantitative analysis
of the real e¤ect of loan supply shocks, this research assesses its impact on two di¤erent measures
of economic activity, domestic demand and non-primary GDP, with an aim to shed light about the
di¤erent ways a shock can a¤ect a countrys macroeconomic structure.
In the countries under study, the banking sector has expanded considerably, which may suggest
that the dynamics between the banking system and real economic activity may not remain constant
over time, as documented by Barnett and Thomas (2014) for other cases. Along these lines,
the model proposed in this research is a time-varying parameter VAR with stochastic volatility
(TVP-VAR-SV) similar to the specication suggested by Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2015) and
Gambetti and Musso (2017). The use of time-varying parameters in the model allows to estimate
the time-varying dynamics between variables while, according to Nakajima (2011), the introduction
of stochastic volatility is expected to improve the estimation of the model. In order to identify the
loan supply shocks, sign restrictions are employed. In this regard, Paustian (2007) argues that it
is required to identify as many shocks as possible to identify a particular shock. Thus, four kinds
of shocks are identied: aggregate demand (AD) shocks, aggregate supply (AS) shocks, monetary
policy (MP) shocks, and loan supply (LS) shocks. In this baseline specication, an expansive
LS shock generates a negative response in loan rates and a positive response in credit volume,
as well as a positive response in both GDP growth and ination. The model is estimated using
Bayesian techniques, which is suitable for the high dimensionality of the parameter space and for
the non-linearities of the model; see Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2015).
In order to assess the presence of time-varying parameters in the model, three tests are per-
formed: the trace test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the t-test. The results reveal the existence
of signicant changes in the distribution of parameters across time for all countries. In the case
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of the trace test, the 16%, 50% and 84% percentiles are greater than trace, indicating that the
coe¢ cients are subject to multiple shocks, causing them not to remain constant. On the other
hand, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the t-test indicate that the distributions of most of the
coe¢ cients change across the analyzed periods in all countries.
Results from the baseline model indicate that LS shocks have a signicant e¤ect on real eco-
nomic activity in all PA countries. In particular, the e¤ect is estimated to be higher in Colombia,
Mexico, and Peru than in Chile, which may be explained by the di¤erences across PA countries
nancial structures. By including the magnitude of the shocks in the analysis through variance
decomposition, LS shocks appear to account for a large share of the variance decomposition of GDP
growth in all countries, about 16% of the total share, larger than AS shocks and as large as AD
shocks. Moreover, the analysis of historical decomposition shows that LS shocks appear to be an
important factor driving the slowdown periods of GDP growth in all PA countries. In particular,
during the Russian and Asian crises of the late 1990s, LS shocks, associated with the sudden stop
of external capital ows triggered by enhanced global risk, diminished GDP growth by about -0.67
percentage points in Chile, Colombia, and Peru. In contrast, in Mexico the rst negative shocks
occurred after 2000, implying that the e¤ect is slow to materialize in this economy.
Regarding the evolution of the e¤ect of LS shocks, the t-test and the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test
are performed to assess whether the impact has changed over time. Therefore, it is estimated that
the distribution of the impulse response function shows signicant di¤erences across the analyzed
periods, thus showing evidence that the impulse response does not remain constant. Moreover, the
results show that the power of LS shocks to a¤ect GDP growth has evolved in a heterogeneous way
among PA countries. In Colombia and Peru, the impact in recent periods is estimated to be higher
than in the 1990s, while in Mexico and Chile the impact has increased considerably, although at a
certain point it started to decline to levels close to those at the beginning of the sample.
In order to assess the robustness of the results, three sensitivity analyses are performed: di¤erent
prior specications, di¤erent measures of external variables, and multiple sets of sign restrictions.
In most specications the results do not di¤er much from baseline, indicating that the analysis is
robust. Moreover, an important result is obtained in the analysis of di¤erent sets of sign restrictions.
As can be observed in the baseline model, the response of real economic activity to LS shocks is
restricted to be positive. This may cause the true e¤ect not to be captured. For that reason, by
taking a di¤erent approach from the previous empirical literature, the response of GDP growth to
LS shocks is not restricted and the estimated response might be interpreted as the genuine response.
This idea follows the agnostic identication proposed by Uhlig (2005). The results indicate that,
even in this agnostic identication, the response of real economic activity remains positive and
signicant.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a comprehensive review of the literature,
both theoretical and empirical. Section 3 lays out the econometric model, explains the statistical
methodology for estimating the parameters, provides a brief description of the data, and discusses
the identication scheme. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the model. Section 5
discusses the robustness of the results and explains some limitations of the model. Sections 6
provides the conclusions. An Appendix contains detailed information about the data and sources.
2 Literature Review
The initial approach to the study of credit markets focuses on nancial intermediaries as a propa-
gation mechanism of disturbances generated in other markets. This was emphasized rst by Fisher
(1933) in his debt-deation theory, where the author argues that a generalized decrease in prices
increases the value of banking credit and, as a result, agents stop consuming to pay their debts, so
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aggregate demand decreases more than due to the initial shock.
Fishers analysis is complemented by Roosa (1951), who proposes a di¤erent mechanism whereby
credit markets propagate monetary policy (the availability doctrine). In this context, monetary
policy a¤ects bank funds directly rather than indirectly through interest rates. This is called the
lending channel of the availability doctrine. Although it is a supply-side theory, it does not describe
how the banks o¤er credit and ignores the role of demand. In this respect, the credit view or credit
channel literature argues that both the interest rate channel and the bank lending channel operate
together; see Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Moreover, this literature proposes a second channel,
known as the balance sheet channel, where a restrictive monetary policy decreases asset prices,
thereby contracting the value of borrowerscollateral and deteriorating their creditworthiness. In
this vein, credit markets have the role of amplifying the impact of monetary policy.1
An assumption of the literature discussed is that nancial markets are complete. However, as
Bernanke (1983) emphasizes, nancial markets are incomplete because intermediation has trans-
action and information costs. Following this approach, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), by modeling
incomplete contracts, propose a di¤erent mechanism through which the nancial sector propagates
shocks. In this theory, small technology or income shocks generate large cycles due to changes
in collateral value and credit constraints. In the same line, Bernanke et al. (1999) introduce an
external nance premium, called the nancial accelerator, which depends inversely on the wealth
of borrowers. The authors argue that, in economic booms, agency costs fall because borrowers are
more likely to pay their debts while the reverse happens in recessions. In this approach, credit
markets work as a propagation mechanism that amplies economic cycles. Nevertheless, Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2001) propose that agency costs do not have an amplication role, but rather dampen
the initial response of output to the shock.
The literature cited above considers that credit markets are a propagation channel, so there
is no role for credit markets in driving business cycle uctuations. Indeed, Cochrane (1994) and
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that credit is not a driving force of economic uctuations, except
in nancial crises. However, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) criticize this position because models
do not explicitly include a banking sector. For that reason, they introduce the banking sector in
DSGE models and formulate explicit shocks originated in the supply side of credit markets. In
particular, they propose two types of nancial shocks: (i) a banking productivity shock or a loan
productivity shock; and (ii) an e¤ective collateral shock or a nancial distress shock. From this
specication, the authors nd that the cost of adjustment in bank production generates a banking
attenuating e¤ect that works in the opposite direction of the nancial accelerator mentioned by
Bernanke et al. (1999); and detect that nancial shocks are major drivers of macroeconomic
variables.
One important assumption in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) is that nancial frictions2 are
located on the supply side of credit markets. In this respect, Christiano et al. (2010) propose a
model where frictions are located on the demand side of credit; i.e., entrepreneurs. They propose,
among other disturbances, three shocks, one related to the demand side and the other two related to
the supply side: (i) a nancial wealth shock (shocks on nancial frictions related to entrepreneurs),
(ii) banking sector technology shocks; and (iii) shocks associated with the relative value of excess
reserves (both associated with banks). The results from this specication is that the inclusion
of banks has little e¤ect on most of the variables. Moreover, the authors nd that the shock on
1More recently, Borio and Zhu (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2009) complemented the analysis of credit markets
and monetary policy by proposing a di¤erent propagation mechanism called risk-taking channel monetary policy not
only a¤ects the quantity but also the quality of credit.
2Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) present a comprehensive literature review on nancial frictions.
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nancial friction is most relevant than the nancial shocks related to nancial intermediaries.3
However, the analysis by Christiano et al. (2010) assumes perfect competition in credit markets.
Gerali et al. (2010) criticize this assumption and formulate a model with an imperfectly competitive
banking sector and nancial frictions on the demand side. In their approach, banks have market
power and o¤er di¤erent rates for deposits and loans. The main ndings are that banks have
two roles in the economy: (i) as a shield for economic agents against interest rate uctuations,
which creates an attenuating e¤ect as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007); and (ii) as a source of
volatility that a¤ects business cycle uctuations.4
On the other hand, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) develop a representative rm model in which
investment is nanced using both debt and equity. In their model, if the rm chooses to default,
lenders can recover only a fraction of their net worth, and shocks on the fraction the lender can
recover severely alter rmsborrowing limits. The authors nd that these shocks arising from the
lending sector are an important driver of business cycles. Moreover, Khan and Thomas (2013) nd
that, in absence of any real shock on the economy, a credit shock originated in the nancial system
produces a recession which can be not only large but also persistent.
In general, as documented by Claessens et al. (2017), there is a theoretical consensus that credit
markets have a dual role in macroeconomics: as a propagation mechanism of shocks originated in
other markets and as a source of shocks driving business cycle uctuations. Moreover, these shocks
arising from the nancial sector could have an important contribution to macroeconomic variables.
In particular, these nancial disturbances that are essentially credit supply shocks are the main
interest of this research. The denition may vary according to researchersassumptions. In this
research, credit supply shocks are dened along the same lines as Hafstead and Smith (2012); i.e.,
as a negative shock on the cost of bank intermediation.5 Specically, a negative shock on bank
intermediation costs can be understood as a decrease in the costs incurred by banks to provide
credit to their clients.
Regarding the empirical literature, the evidence from early research on LS shocks supports
both a high importance and a low relevance of such disturbances for real economic activity. For
instance, Stock and Watson (1989), Friedman and Kuttner (1992), and Kashyap et al. (1994)
nd that proxies of credit conditions have a predictive power for real economic activity. However,
Ramey (1993) estimates a multivariate error correction model and detects that credit variables such
as credit velocity and the loan-to-securities ratio has a minimal contribution to output. In fact,
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that identifying output or credit movements due to a shift in
credit demand or supply is particularly di¢ cult. On the one hand, credit volume could increase
because households and rms may demand more for consumption or investment, respectively. On
the other hand, banks may be willing to o¤er more credit because of positive economic conditions.
Thus, it is not possible to assess the role of LS shocks on economic activity because there is an
important identication problem. Furthermore, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that LS shocks
can play a role only during economic crises and their contribution to real activity during stability
3Arend (2010) presents an analysis of this novel literature on credit markets. The author points out that to
capture the importance of credit market shocks, nancial frictions must be located inside the nancial intermediaries
sector; i.e., on the supply side of credit markets. However, subsequent literature proposes that the importance of
credit markets as source of disturbances could stem from nancial frictions on both the supply or demand sides.
4These results are discussed in detail in Viziniuc (2015).
5The closest denition to the one adopted in this research is proposed by Gerali et al. (2010), who dene the
shocks arising from the banking sector as shocks on loan rates, on the loan-to-value ratio, and on bank capital. For
their part, Christiano et al. (2010) dene credit supply shocks as bank funding technology shocks and as bank reserve
demand shocks. Moreover, Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) characterize loan supply shocks as bank resource cost shocks
and bank loss rate shocks. Another denition is proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2011), who argue that credit supply
shocks can be understood as shocks on bank capital quality and shocks on banks net worth.
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periods may be very small.6
Another strand of empirical literature uses sign restriction methodologies as proposed by Faust
(1998), Canova and De Nicoló (2002), and Uhlig (2005) to isolate LS shocks. Bean et al. (2010) and
De Nicoló and Lucchetta (2011) propose that credit supply shocks can be isolated from demand
shocks by restricting supply shocks to a¤ect credit volume and loan rates in di¤erent directions. In
their econometric approach, Bean et al. (2010) estimate Bayesian VAR models for the U.S. and the
UK, and detect that both credit supply and credit demand shocks explain credit growth as much
as aggregate supply and demand shocks. On the other hand, De Nicoló and Lucchetta (2011) use
a frequentist approach to estimate a factor-augmented VAR for G-7 countries, and nd that loan
demand shocks account for most of the movement of credit growth and, in some countries, for the
movement of GDP growth.
Nevertheless, Meeks (2012) criticizes previous literature and argues that restrictions must be
imposed only on pure nancial variables. In this way, the author uses a VAR model and identies
the model by imposing restrictions only on spreads and default rates and assuming an agnostic
position on the response of GDP. He nds that credit supply shocks have a lesser impact on
economic activity in stable times, but are highly important during economic crises, which conrms
the stance of Bernanke and Gertler (1995). In a similar line, Helbling et al. (2011) argue that the
response of other variables needs to be restricted to identify LS shocks. In this regard, instead of
imposing restrictions only on credit volume and loan rates, they also impose productivity to increase
and default rates to diminish. They document that credit market shocks have a considerable impact
on output, but the e¤ects on other variables are not signicant.
The cited literature proposes that the sign restriction approach can isolate shocks. However,
the response of variables to an LS shock may be the same as for an MP shock or an AS shock.
In this regard, Hristov et al. (2012) criticize previous identication schemes and propose that the
response of monetary policy should go in the opposite direction of the response of the lending rate
when LS shocks hit the economy. Based on this approach, they estimate a panel VAR for Euro Area
countries and nd that a considerable share of the decline of GDP growth (about 0.6 percentage
points) and credit growth (around 1.9 percentage points) is related to LS shocks, and they show
that the Euro Area has an important degree of nancial heterogeneity.
A common feature of previous literature is that sign restrictions are imposed at the time of im-
pact. Nevertheless, the impact of nancial shocks may take some time to a¤ect economic activity.
Taking into consideration this idea, Barnett and Thomas (2014) propose an identication based
on both zero and sign restrictions. In particular, they impose GDP growth not to react contem-
poraneously to LS shocks. The estimation of their model shows that an adverse LS shock drives
GDP growth and ination in opposite directions in the UK. Along the same lines, Halvorsena and
6One strand of empirical literature assesses the identication problem by using micro data. Lown et al. (2000) use
information of bankers surveyed to build an index that can be assumed as a measure of loan supply. They introduce
the index in a reduced model and detect that changes in credit standards, dened as a companys requirements to
establish customer creditworthiness, are highly correlated with commercial bank lending and GDP. However, their
analysis relies on reduced-form models. For instance, Lown and Morgan (2006) estimate a recursive SVAR that
includes the credit standards index and conrm the results of Lown et al. (2000). Moreover, they detect that credit
standards are signicant in predicting real GDP and inventory investment in the trade sector. More recently, Bassett
et al. (2014) provided similar evidence using this approach. For other studies in this literature, see Del Giovane et al.
(2011) and Darracq Paries and De Santis (2015). The micro data-based methodology discussed above assumes that
bank surveys capture exogenous changes in bank activity. However, bankersresponse may be inuenced by credit
demand conditions. Moreover, the construction of the index is subject to the criteria of the researcher, so di¤erent
specications may lead to di¤erent results. In this regard, although this literature attempts to overcome the problem,
demand conditions are not fully isolated. As a result, a possibility is to use nonlinear models. However, under this
approach, a researcher models the relevance of credit through credit market states and there is not an explicit LS
shock. See Balke (2000), and Calza and Sousa (2006).
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Jacobsen (2014) implement di¤erent identication sets by mixing zeroes and sign restrictions. Us-
ing data from Norway and the UK, the authors show that the importance of LS shocks in business
cycle uctuations is robust under multiple identication schemes.
Moreover, Barnett and Thomas (2014) suggest the possibility that the impact of LS shocks
has not remained constant over time because banking sectors have expanded considerably. For
this reason, they estimate rolling-window regressions and nd that the impact of LS shocks has
increased over time and that its e¤ect has become more persistent. These results suggest that
coe¢ cients in models are time-varying. Following this idea, Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2015) use
a TVP-VAR-SV, introduced by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005), to capture the
changing e¤ects over time in Euro Area countries. They follow previous literature and identify the
model by sign restrictions based on the theoretical model of Gerali et al. (2010). The ndings
suggest that, besides the important role of LS shocks in driving economic uctuations, the e¤ect
of these shocks has increased strongly after the nancial crisis. Moreover, the authors document
that after the 2008 crisis, homogeneous countries began to show a heterogeneous behavior. In
a similar fashion, Gambetti and Musso (2017) estimate a TVP-VAR-SV to study credit supply
shocks on three important economic areas: the UK, the U.S., and the Euro Area. The authors
detect signicant time variation in parameters and estimate that LS shocks play an important
role in driving GDP growth, ination, and credit growth, particularly during economic crises. For
example, the authors estimate that the contribution of these shocks explains almost 20% of the
decline in GDP growth in the recent crisis for the Euro Area and the U.S.
An important feature of the literature discussed is that it focuses on countries where banking
operations have stabilized after a period of accelerated development, and capital markets have
taken on a greater role as a source of funds. In this context, LS shocks may account partially for
the e¤ect of nancial markets, but may not be the main contributor. For this reason, this research
attempts to show evidence from economies where banking sectors are the main source of funds. In
particular, the countries under study are Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru; i.e., the members of
the PA bloc. Unlike other countries,7 there is no empirical literature assessing the e¤ects of LS
shocks on real economic activity in PA countries. Moreover, in order to provide a richer quantitative
analysis of the real e¤ect of LS shocks, this research assesses their impact on two di¤erent measures
of economic activity, domestic demand and non-primary GDP, which sheds light on the ways a
shock can a¤ect a countrys macroeconomic structure.
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 The Empirical Model
The empirical approach follows the model proposed by Primiceri (2005), which is a TVP-VAR-SV
model. On one hand, the inclusion of time-varying coe¢ cients attempts to capture the evolution of
macroeconomic dynamics. On the other hand, multivariate stochastic volatility allows to capture
shocks heteroskedasticity, which improves estimates according to Nakajima (2011). Consider the
reduced-form VAR:
yt = B0;t +
pX
i=1
Bi;tyt i + ut; (1)
7Abildgren (2012) for Denmark; Deryugina, et al. (2015) for Russia; Duchi and Elbourne (2016) for Netherlands;
Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2014) for Norway; Houssa et al. (2013) for South Africa; Mwabutwa et al. (2013) for
Malawi; Kabashi and Suleva (2016) for Macedonia; Hosszú (2018) for Hungary; Pereira and da Silva Fonseca (2012)
for Brazil; Bäurle and Scheufele (2016) for Switzerland.
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where yt is an n 1 vector of endogenous variables, t = 1; 2 : : : ; T , B0;t is an n 1 vector of time-
varying intercepts, Bi;t is an nn matrix of time-varying coe¢ cients, and ut is the heteroskedastic
innovation, such that E(ut) = 0 and E(utu0t) = t, where []ij 6= 0 for each i 6= j. The variance-
covariance matrix t is factorized by triangular decomposition t = A 1t HtH 0tA
 10
t , where At is an
nn lower triangular matrix that associates variance of structural innovation with variance of the
model in its reduced form; i.e. contemporaneous coe¢ cients:
At =
2666664
1 0    0
21;t 1
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
n1;t    n(n 1);t 1
3777775 ; (2)
and Ht is an n n diagonal matrix that contains the standard deviations of the structural errors:
Ht =
2666664
1;t 0    0
0 2;t
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0    0 n;t
3777775 : (3)
In order to obtain a tractable model, the VAR is transformed into a simultaneous equation model.
Let Z 0t = [1; y0t 1; : : : ; y0t p] be a row vector of exogenous variables and Bt = [B0;t; B1;t; : : : Bp;t] a
matrix of time-varying coe¢ cients. Then, the elements of Bt are stacked such that t = vec(B
0
t),
where vec is the column stacking operator. Thus, equation (1) can be written as:
yt = [In 
 Z 0t]t +A 1t Htt; (4)
where the operator
 is the Kronecker product and ut = A 1t Htt, where the term t is the structural
shock, such that E(t0t) = 0 for each i 6= j.
In order to establish the dynamics of the model, it is required to collect the components of Ht
and At. In this way, the i < j elements of At are compiled in a vector t = [21;t; 31;t; : : : ; n(n 1);t]0
and the diagonal elements of Ht in a vector t = [1;t; 2;t; : : : ; n;t]0. Then, by proposing a law of
motion for t; t and t, the dynamics of the model can be expressed as:
t = t 1 + t; (5)
t = t 1 +  t; (6)
lnt = lnt 1 + 't; (7)
where t  N(0;),  t  N(0;) and 't  N(0;) and matrices of innovations , , and
 are diagonal.
Note that t and t are modeled as random walks, while t is a geometric random walk process.
These assumptions have important implications. First, the model specication allows to capture
both transitory and permanent shifts in the parameters, which is desirable for the purposes of
this research. However, the variance of parameters depends on time; thus, it increases arbitrarily
as the sample increases. Second, by assuming a random walk for the law of movements of the
parameters, the underlying shift in coe¢ cients can be captured. Nevertheless, spurious movements
and implausible coe¢ cient behavior may be estimated, given that the model allows parameters to
move freely. Regarding the rst negative implication, Primiceri (2005) shows through simulations
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that results are similar in both specications, whether random walks or autoregressive processes.
Regarding the second case, the movement of parameters can be controlled by the prior tightness
of the covariance matrix of innovations. Thus, by choosing suitable prior tightness, the model can
be estimated appropriately. However, di¤erent set of priors might lead to di¤erent models. So,
as marked by Nakajima (2011), a prior sensitivity analysis would be necessary in order to assess
robustness of the results. For this reason, in the last part of the paper, a sensitivity analysis of
priors is presented.
There are four sources of shocks in the model: structural shocks t, disturbances associated
with the time-varying parameters t, innovations from contemporaneous coe¢ cients  t, and shocks
from stochastic volatility 't. These innovations are collected in a vector V such that:
V = V ar
266664
t
t
 t
't
377775 =
266664
In 0 0 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 
377775 ; (8)
where it is assumed that all shocks in the model are orthogonal; i.e., V is a diagonal matrix and
Nakajima (2011) shows that the results are not sensitive to this assumption.
In order to study the dynamics of the model through impulse response functions (IRFs), equa-
tion (1) is converted into its moving average representation:
yt = t +	t(L)ut; (9)
where t is the time-varying mean of yt and 	t(L) =
P1
j=1	j;tL
j is the time-varying multiplier of
the Wold decomposition. The IRFs are determined by 	t(L), but the targets are structural IRFs
dened by 	t(L)A 1t Ht. To achieve this objective, sign restrictions are used. The implementation
of sign restrictions need an orthogonal matrix R such that RR0 = R0R = In. By including the
identity matrix in the decomposition of t = A 1t HtInH 0tA
 10
t and by replacing In, the result is t =
A 1t HtRR0H 0tA
 10
t . Thus, the innovation of the reduced form is such that ut = A
 1
t HtRt. Note
that the expression of ut has changed. However, since matrix R is orthogonal, the decomposition
of t is not altered. Moreover, A 1t HtH 0tR is not necessarily a triangular matrix, and therefore
the IRFs are IRF = 	t(L)A 1t HtR. Nevertheless, matrix R is not unique. For that reason, many
draws are simulated for each possible value of R.
3.2 Estimation
Given the context of a high number of parameters, high dimensionality of the parameter space, and
non-linearity (Primiceri, 2005; Koop and Korobilis, 2010; Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda, 2015), we use
a Bayesian approach to estimate the model.8 The parameters to be estimated are t; t; lnt;  ,
, and . The following priors are assumed for these parameters: 0  N(^; V^), 0  N(^; V^),
ln0  N(ln ^0; In),   W (s1k1V^ ; s1),   W (s2k2V^; s2),   W (s3k3In; s3) where N(a; b)
represent the Normal distribution with mean a and variance b, and W (R; h) represent the Wishart
distribution with scale matrix R and h degrees of freedom. The priors are calibrated with the
estimation of ^; ^; V^; V^ and ln ^0 by OLS. The values s1; s2 and s3 are the degrees of freedom
of each prior , and are set equal to the corresponding number of rows of ; and , respectively.
The parameters k1; k2 and k3 control the tightness of the priors. In the context of TVP-VAR-SV,
these parameters represent the prior beliefs of time variation. In particular, k1; k2 and k3 are set
8For the detailed process of the estimation, see the online Appendix of Galí and Gambetti (2015).
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to 0.0005, 0.05, and 0.5, respectively, which are similar to the priors used by Gambetti and Musso
(2017). These parameters are modied in the sensitivity section.
Regarding lag order p, there are no selection criteria in the context of TVP-VAR-SV. Thus, to
approximate the lag order, a plain VAR is estimated with the same variables and selection criteria
are then calculated. In general, the results are the following: the AIC, HQ, and SIC criteria
choose p = 8, p = 2, and p = 1, respectively. In order to avoid overparameterization, the Schwarz
criterion is selected, thus p = 1.
Finally, the simulation is performed for 10,000 Gibbs iterations, discarding the rst 5,000 and
collecting one of every 5 iterations from the remaining 5,000. Thus, 1,000 draws are collected. The
rst sampling of the priors is estimated by ordinary least squares.
3.3 Data
The variables analyzed are six (n = 6): real GDP annual growth, annual ination, loan volume
annual growth, the loan rate, the short-term interest rate, and Standard & Poors General Stock
Commodity Index (SPGSCI) annual growth. The denitions and sources of variables associated
with each country, as well as the methodology to construct each series, is detailed in the Appendix.
The selected sample period for the analysis is restricted to availability of the loan rate. This causes
the span of data to vary among the countries under study. In particular, data for Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and Peru are available for the periods 1990Q1-2017Q1, 1994Q1-2017Q1, 1995Q3-2017Q1,
and 1993Q2-2017Q1, respectively. Series in levels are presented in Figure 1, while series in annual
growth terms are presented in Figure 2.
Real GDP levels show a positive trend in all countries. However, during the late 1990s an
interruption in the positive evolution of GDP is observed. A similar scenario is detected during the
period 2007-2008. While analyzing the annual growth rates, it is observed that during those periods
growth rates fell moderately, with a larger decline in 2007-2008. Such periods of contraction of
economic activity in all PA countries are associated with international economic crises, specically
the Asian-Russian crisis and the global nancial crisis. From this evidence, it is observed that
the countries are synchronized during their crisis stages, but the severity of crises varies across
countries.
For the rst part of the sample, ination shows a declining behavior in all countries, reecting
the corrective measures implemented in response to the high-ination periods experienced in the
past. Then, ination stabilizes around 3% in Chile and Peru, around 4% in Colombia, and around
4.5% in Mexico. As in the case of GDP growth, during the 2008 crisis ination declined moderately.
In the rst part of the sample, credit showed high growth rates, explained by the nancial
liberalization policies that allowed access to external funding and resulted in an expanding banking
system. In subsequent periods, the explosive growth rate normalized. In the late 1990s, as a result
of the Asian-Russian crisis and associated sudden stop episodes, credit compressed in all countries,
but with less severity in Chile. In the second part of the sample, credit recovered and entered into
a more stable stage than in the rst half of the sample.
For all countries, the loan rate shows a marked negative trend, from levels between 20%-45% to
close to 10%. Moreover, it is observed that the volatility of lending rates decreases as the sample
progresses, which could be the result of banking expansion and improved macroeconomic stability.
As in the case of the loan rate, the short-term interest rate in all countries shows its highest
values in the rst part of the sample. It is also observed that in such periods the interest rates
register high levels of volatility compared to the second half of the sample. This result is consistent
with the adoption of ination targeting by all PA central banks. During the last part of the sample,
which is associated with a more stable macroeconomic behavior, the short-term interest rates range
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at around 3.5% in Chile and Peru, and around 6.5% in Colombia and Mexico.
Finally, as PA countries are low- and middle-income economies, they are subject to external
shocks, as documented by Castillo and Salas (2010) and Rodríguez et al. (2018). In this regard,
the external conditions are introduced into the model by the SPGSCI (Standard & Poors Gold-
man Sachs Commodity Index), which represents the general level of commodity prices and world
economic activity. The series does not show a clear trend over the rst half of the sample. However,
in the late 1990s, moderate negative growth rates are observed, which could reect the negative
consequences on world activity of the Asian and Russian crises. In the following periods, as China
registered growth rates above 8% and boosted global demand for commodities, the SPGSCI started
to show a positive trend. Nevertheless, this trend was interrupted by the 2008 crisis, where it records
a strong fall. Since the crisis, it does not show a clear trend.
3.4 The Identication Scheme
This paper is focused on loan supply shocks which are identied by sign restrictions. However, as
Paustian (2007) argues, it is necessary to identify as many shocks as possible to identify a particular
shock. Thus, four kinds of shocks are identied: aggregate demand (AD) shocks, aggregate supply
(AS) shocks, monetary policy (MP) shocks, and a credit supply (LS) shocks.
An AD shock is generated by transitory shocks, such as an unexpected increase in consumption,
investment or scal spending; and by permanent shocks, such a preferences shock. Theoretical lit-
erature agrees that these kinds of shocks drive GDP growth and ination in the same direction.
However, the impact on credit markets does not seem to be clear. For example, a positive con-
sumption shock increases credit demand; thus, the loan volume increases, but agents requiring to
raise their consumption withdraw their bank deposits, so bank funds decrease and the loan volume
cannot expand, or can even decrease. In this regard, the loan volume is not restricted, similarly
to the scheme proposed in Hristov et al. (2012). On the other hand, in the context of an AD
shock, central banks react by raising the interest rate to avoid inationary pressures in line with
the monetary policy rule, in turn boosting the loan rate due to the link between interest rates and
the monetary policy rate. Thus, the short-term interest rate and the loan rate are restricted to be
positive.
AS shocks are generated by technology shocks and cost shocks, such as an oil price shock or wage
shocks. In this case, GDP and ination move in opposite directions. Regarding credit markets, a
negative AS shock that pushes up costs may decrease investment and the loan volume. However,
rms may attempt to fund their higher costs through loans, which may increase credit volume.
Moreover, as GDP is falling and ination is rising, there is no clear central bank response, so the
e¤ect on the short-term interest rate is unclear, as well as the response of the loan rate. Because
of these unclear e¤ects, the responses of credit volume, the short-term interest rate, and the loan
rate are unrestricted.
An MP shock is an unexpected intervention of the monetary authority through the short-term
interest rate. A positive MP shock rises the short-term interest rate, decreases GDP and reduces
ination. The e¤ect on the loan volume is ambiguous. On the one hand, as a result of the high
opportunity cost of money, agents prefer to save; thus bank funds increase, which means that credit
to the private sector could rise. On the other hand, the higher interest rates makes borrowing more
expensive, so agents demand less credit. In the model proposed by Gerali et al. (2009) and Atta-
Mensah and Dib (2008), the loan volume responds negatively to a positive MP shock, while in
the model proposed by Christiano et al. (2010) the sign is unclear. As the response of the loan
volume in credit markets seems unclear, the response of the loan rate may also be uncertain. In
this context, both variables are unrestricted.
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LS shocks are associated with a bank intermediation cost shock, a bank capital shock or a
bank technology shock; see Christiano et. al. (2010), Gerali et al. (2010), Hafstead and Smith
(2012). For instance, a positive LS shock increases the availability of credit for the private sector,
thereby pushing up the loan volume beyond the market equilibrium and creating an oversupply.
This excess of funds in the market pushes down the loan rate. Thus, an LS shock drives the
loan volume and the loan rate in opposite directions. Since these restrictions are not su¢ cient
to di¤erentiate LS shocks from other disturbances (LS shocks orthogonal to other shocks), other
variables are restricted, as suggested by Hristov et al. (2012). In particular, the responses of GDP
and ination are restricted. In this regard, given that credit becomes inexpensive, rms increase
their investment and households demand more for consumption, thus GDP increases. At the same
time, as economic activity expands, rms expect higher prices; thus, they increase their current
prices. Regarding this issue, in theoretical literature there is no consensus about the response of
ination to an LS shock. However, most of the literature supports that the response of ination
is positive, as detailed by Gambetti and Musso (2017); thus, the response of ination is restricted
to be positive. On the contrary, the response of the short-term interest rate is unrestricted. This
specication is proposed because, in a similar way as in the case of AS shocks, LS shocks are di¢ cult
to observe by the central bank. Therefore, leaving the short-term interest rate unrestricted may be
appropriate.
Table 1 summarizes the sign restrictions used to identify each shock in the model. It should be
noted that while there are six variables, only four shocks are identied. Conceptually, the remaining
shocks, which are not identied, are loan demand shocks and external shocks, the latter related
to the SPGSCI. In this respect, rst, the loan demand shock is not identied because of lack of
theoretical evidence describing its potential e¤ects. Second, although there is evidence of the e¤ects
of external shocks, the literature does not assess the role of these shocks when the banking sector
is included in the model. Following the argument of Gambetti and Musso (2017), although these
shocks are not identied, they may act as a bu¤er and capture the e¤ect of omitted variables.
Finally, regarding the response of the SPGSCI to identied shocks, it is unrestricted in all cases
because PA countries are considered small economies and cannot inuence the global economy.
In order to identify the proposed shocks, sign restrictions are only imposed at the time of impact.
In case of estimation, those draws that satisfy the proposed sign restrictions are collected from the
orthogonal R matrices generated, and all the others cases are discarded. From the pool of draws,
the result of interest is the median of the impulse response functions (IRFs) and the 16% and 84%
percentiles for the standard deviations that represent the 5% signicance level; see Sims and Zha
(1999).
4 Results
Before discussing the results of the model, three tests are performed to assess the presence of time-
varying parameters in the model. As in Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2015), the trace test, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the t-test are performed. In the rst case, the trace test reports
whether the prior of the variance-covariance matrix associated with the movement law of the
parameters is smaller than the posterior. According to Cogley and Sargent (2005), if the trace is
lower than the percentiles, there is evidence that the coe¢ cients are subject to multiple shocks, so
they do not remain constant. In the second case, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates whether
two di¤erent vectors have the same continuous distribution. In the third case, the t-test determines
if the mean of two random samples belongs to the same normal distribution. The tests are performed
for elements of matrices B, H and A resulting from the estimation of the model for each country.
The results are presented in Table 2. The analysis is performed for two di¤erent periods in
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two cases, the beginning of the sample against the middle of the sample (symbolized by 1-2), then
the middle of the sample against the end of the sample (symbolized by 2-3). In general, the tests
reveal the existence of time variation in the parameters estimated for each country. In the case of
the trace test, it is estimated that the trace value is lower than the 16%, 50%, and 84% percentiles,
indicating that coe¢ cients are subject to multiple shocks that made them not to remain constant
over the time. On the other hand, results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicate that most of
the estimated parameters of B; H and A present signicant di¤erences across their distributions
when comparing the samples in the two cases, which indicates that parameters evolve over time.
Moreover, results from the t-test suggest that the di¤erence in mean between the samples of most
of the coe¢ cients is signicant, which conrms the previous results. Thus, the evidence suggests
that the model specication, a TVP-VAR-SV, is appropriate for the analyzed data.
4.1 Stochastic Volatility
The results for stochastic volatility are presented in Figure 3. The blue lines correspond to the
median of the distribution, while the upper and lower red lines represent the condence intervals
corresponding to the 84th and 16th percentiles, respectively. The evidence suggests that volatility
does not remain constant; instead, it appears to evolve over time. In the case of GDP growth, Chile,
Colombia, and Peru show similar patterns. At the end of the 1990s, output volatility reached its
highest values, ranging between 5%-10% for Peru and Chile, and between 3%-4% for Colombia.
This behavior can be associated with the consolidation of liberalization reforms in these countries
and the impact of the Russian-Asian crisis. In particular, the latter became important, as a result
of the reforms that opened trade and liberalized the nancial sector. Moreover, it is observed that
volatility in Perus GDP is higher than in other PA countries, which can be explained by El Niño
Phenomenon, which also a¤ected this economy in 1997. After these episodes, volatility shows a
negative trend, interrupted partially by the volatility increase generated during the global nancial
crisis of 2008. However, the increase in volatility during the nancial crisis was lower than during
the late-1990s crisis in Chile, Colombia, and Peru. While these countrieshigh volatility episodes
are located in the late 1990s, Mexicos higher volatility period is at the beginning of the sample,
with the Tequila crisis; and in 2009, in the wake of the global nancial crisis. Unlike other PA
countries, Mexicos trade is more integrated with the U.S., which could explain the greater impact
of 2008 crisis on its economy.
In contrast with the results for GDP growth, the stochastic volatility of ination is estimated
to be smaller in magnitude in all of PA countries. Moreover, the evolution of ination volatility
appears to be similar for Chile and Peru. In these countries, ination volatility registers its highest
values on the rst part of the sample and drops over the following periods. This can be explained by
the high ination periods in these countries during the 1980s (3,000% and 150% in Peru and Chile,
respectively) and the subsequent policy measures to control it. Later, these countries adopted an
ination targeting scheme, which contributed to controlling ination and reducing its volatility.
Ination volatility in Colombia shows a di¤erent pattern. At the beginning of the sample, volatility
is relatively small, but with a marked positive trend. In 1999 it reached its highest values over
the whole sample; then the trend turned negative with the adoption of ination targeting and the
elimination of exchange rate controls. Similarly, stochastic volatility in Mexico shows a positive
trend at the beginning of the sample, which can be explained by the subsequent e¤ects of the
Tequila crisis. Then, volatility declined as the economy became more stable in macroeconomic
terms.
Regarding the stochastic volatility of loan volume growth, it appears to show a heterogeneous
behavior across countries. However, some similarities can be detected. In particular, Peru and Chile
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register periods of high credit volatility between 1997 and 2003. This unstable period responds to
a number factors. During the reform period, free entry of capitals was permitted and regulation
of the banking sector decreased, which made the nancial sector more linked to the world. Thus,
when the Asian-Russian crisis erupted, capital ows to these countries stopped, causing banks to
lose funds, and credit became more volatile. In Colombia, credit volatility increases heavily since
2001 and reaches a peak of 137% in 2003. During this period there were many banking mergers and
acquisitions, and consequently the competition for funds and the risk taken by banks increased,
which can explain the rising volatility. In contrast, credit volatility in Mexico shows a growing
trend over the rst part of the sample. This is consistent with the banking crisis in Mexico caused
by risky lending practices after the privatization of public banks. Later this e¤ect began to decline.
Loan rate volatility shows a more uniform behavior across PA countries, with higher values at
certain parts of the sample and a marked downward trend in the second part of the sample. At
the beginning, loan rate volatility reaches its highest levels, ranging between 6%-12% in Colombia,
Peru and Chile, and between 10%-25% in Mexico, which is consistent with the high volatility of
ination during the same periods. In particular, as ination rates were very high in 1993-1995,
banks attempted to set a higher loan rate to avoid negative real interest rates, which can explain
the behavior at the beginning of the sample. In the following years, together with a decrease in
ination volatility, loan rate volatility also decreased. In 2004-2017, stochastic volatility ranges
between 0.1%-1% in all cases. This stable pattern responds to the stability of ination and the
short-term interest rate, which can be linked to monetary policy rules implemented in PA countries.
Regarding the stochastic volatility of the short-term interest rate, the estimation suggests that
the volatility path has an instability period, placed at the beginning of the sample, and a more
stable phase over the last decade. Regarding Mexico, short-term rate volatility registers high values
at the beginning of the sample, corresponding to the banking crisis of 1994. In contrast, the highest
volatility period in Colombia, Peru, and Chile was the late 1990s. Moreover, as a result of the late-
1990s crises, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico su¤ered sudden stops, which caused their crawling band
systems to collapse. Thereafter, short-term interest rate volatility turns small and remains stable.
This pattern is consistent with the adoption of an ination targeting scheme by all PA countries.
In particular, Chile and Colombia adopted the ination targeting scheme in 1999, and Mexico and
Peru implemented it in 2001 and 2002, respectively.
The stochastic volatility of the SPGSCI is much higher for the other variables. This may result
from the fact that the external variable captures much of the volatility of the model. Regarding
its evolution over time, it is observed that the crisis period in the late 1990s represents a smaller
increase in volatility compared with the e¤ect of the 2008 nancial crisis. In that period, SPGSCI
stochastic volatility reached its highest value in all the sample. In this respect, it is observed that
GDP growth uctuations were more drastic in the recent crisis than in the Asian-Russian crisis.
For example, during the recent nancial crisis, GDP growth was 4.2% in 2007 and fell drastically
to -1.7% in 2009, while during the Asian-Russian crisis world GDP growth remained between 2.5%
and 4%, reecting less uncertainty than during the 2008 crisis.
A common feature of estimated volatility in all countries is that it started to decline at the
beginning of 2000 and remained relatively stable during the last decade, which shows evidence of
great moderation in PA countries. In particular, volatility of GDP growth, ination, and interest
rates appears to decline despite the 2008 nancial crisis. These results can be partially explained by
the implementation of scal rules and ination targeting schemes in these countries, as documented
by Garcés (2016) and Castillo et al. (2016).
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4.2 The Impact of Loan Supply Shocks on Real Economic Activity
In the context of time-varying parameters, the shocks may generate multiple non-uniform trajec-
tories in the variables, which make analysis di¤use.9 For this reason, the e¤ects of LS shocks are
normalized with respect to the loan rate. In particular, the median response of the loan rate is set
to be -0.5% at the time of impact over the whole sample for all the countries. The responses of the
remaining variables are weighted according to this restriction. This allows to compare the e¤ects
of LS shocks across periods.
4.2.1 The Average Loan Supply Shock
The mean IRF of an LS shock is reported in Figure 4.10 Some key di¤erences and similarities
arise when assessing the e¤ects of LS shocks across PA countries. In all cases, the e¤ect of a
positive LS shock on real economic activity is strong but short-lived, although the magnitude of
the e¤ect varies across countries. Particularly, on average, in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru an
expansionary credit supply shock boosts GDP growth by about 1%, while the e¤ect in Chile is
much smaller, around 0.5%. These results can be explained by the di¤erent nancial structures of
these countries. On the one hand, the banking system has an important participation in lending
activity of Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, with banks taking a share of around 90% of total credit
to the private sector. On the other hand, Chile has a more developed capital market than other
PA countries. For instance, market capitalization as a percentage of GDP is about 98% in Chile,
while in the remaining countries it ranges between 30%-40%. This suggests that rms in Chile can
substitute bank loans, so the banking system plays a more critical role in Colombia, Mexico, and
Peru than in Chile.
Regarding ination, the impact of the positive credit supply appears to be heterogeneous across
countries. In particular, results from Mexico and Peru indicate a short-lasting impact, up to two
quarters following the shock. In contrast, it is observed that in Chile the shock lasts one quarter,
which can be explained by the more dynamic nancial markets in this economy. Moreover, the
response of ination in Colombia is estimated to be more persistent than in the other countries. In
this case, as the loan rate increases rapidly after falling by 50 basis points, rms face higher credit
prices, which translates into higher prices up to one and a half years following the shock.
In the case of credit market variables, the e¤ect of an expansionary LS shock is more persistent
on credit volume growth than on GDP growth. The e¤ect on the credit volume tends to last
more than three quarters in all countries. These results show that while in the medium run credit
markets expand after the shock, real economic activity does not. In this respect, the increased
credit can be obtained by rms or households; but the fact that real economic activity is not
expanding implies that credit is only expanding for households, which play a less important role
than credit to rms in driving GDP according to Beck et al. (2012). Regarding the loan rate,
their trajectory following the LS shock appears to have broad uncertainty bands and an increasing
behavior in all PA countries. This result may be explained by the moderate degree of credit market
concentration in these countries, which makes the trajectory of the loan rate di¤use. For instance,
Martin et al. (2011) report a Herndahl-Hirschman Index of 1052, 1168, 2145 for Colombia, Chile,
and Peru, respectively, in 2009, while Rodríguez (2012) reports an index of 1404 for Mexico in
2010. Additionally, the response of the short-term interest rate appears to be non-signicant at
9For instance, the LS shock that reduced the loan rate by -1% in 1999 may generate a smaller e¤ect on other
variables than the LS shock that decreased the loan rate by -5% in 2007.
10The results for IRFs are the median, the 84th and the 16th percentiles. Given that the model has time-varying
parameters, the results are obtained for each quarter over the whole sample. Thus, formally speaking, the mean IRF
is the average of the median IRF corresponding to all periods in the entire sample.
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the moment of impact in all cases. A possible explanation is that LS shocks are not completely
visible to the central bank. Thus, the reaction to the monetary authority is not clear. A second
explanation is that these economies register high interest rate spreads, ranging on average between
4%-8% in Colombia, Mexico, and Chile, and 15% in Peru, which may cause the response of the
short-term interest rate to be di¤use following the LS shock.
In order to understand the quantitative importance of an LS shock, the forecast error variance
decomposition (FEVD) is estimated. The mean of the 50% percentiles of variance decompositions in
each moment of time are presented in Figure 5 for GDP growth, ination, loan volume growth, and
the loan rate for horizons 0, 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20.11 The results suggest that the multiple identied
shocks play a similar role among PA countries. In particular, LS shocks appear to account for a large
share of the variance decomposition of GDP growth in all countries, about 16% of the total share
in all horizons of time, higher than that of AS shocks and as high as that of AD shocks. Moreover,
among the identied shocks, MP shocks seem to explain the largest share of GDP volatility, whose
contribution ranges between 15% and 19% in all cases. On average, all shocks contribute about
56% of total GDP variance. The remaining share corresponds to external shocks, which play an
important role in these countries according to Castillo and Salas (2010), Rodríguez et al. (2018),
and to other non-identied shocks. In the case of ination, AS shocks have small e¤ects on ination
volatility at the time of impact. However, in the following periods, its e¤ect increases in all PA
countries. Regarding loan volume growth, both LS shocks and MP shocks appear to be the most
important factors explaining loan volume growth variance, with both sharing about 36% of total
variance, while AD and AS shocks appear to have a less critical role. On the other hand, the
variance decomposition of the loan rate indicates that AD and AS shocks are the main sources of
volatility in that variable, sharing about 38% of total variance.
Both IRFs and FEDV show that LS shocks have an important e¤ect on real economic activity in
PA countries. However, this analysis does not permit to evaluate the role of LS shocks over business
cycles. In order to assess the quantitative importance of LS shocks over business cycle uctuations,
historical decomposition is performed. The contributions of LS, MP, AD, and AS shocks to GDP
growth, ination, loan volume growth, and the loan rate are presented in Figure 6. Two important
results arise from the estimations. First, LS shocks are an important factor driving the slowdown
periods of GDP growth in all PA countries. In particular, during the late-1990s crisis, LS shocks
diminished GDP growth by about -0.67 percentage points in Chile, Colombia, and Peru due to
the sudden stop of external capital ows triggered by increased global risk during the Russian and
Asian crises. Mexico, instead, did not face major negative shocks like other countries during the
late 1990s, but the negative e¤ects of LS shocks hit the economy with a lag after 2000. In the recent
2008 crisis, LS disturbances accounted for a signicant reduction of GDP growth in most countries.
Chile, Mexico, and Peru registered the highest negative impacts, with credit shocks reducing GDP
growth by about -1.19 percentage points, while the contribution was lower in Colombia, with shocks
reducing GDP growth by -0.36 percentage points. This heterogeneous behavior during the 2008
nancial crisis can be explained by the di¤erent degrees of dependence of PA countriesnancial
systems on foreign currencies. For instance, Chile, Mexico, and Peru have higher foreign currency
liabilities/total liabilities and foreign currency loans/total loans ratios than Colombia. Therefore,
Chile, Mexico, and Peru were more vulnerable to the sudden stop episodes caused by the nancial
crisis than Colombia. The second important result is that LS shocks have a considerable role in
driving business cycle uctuations, not only in crisis episodes, but also in stability periods. After
the late-1990s turbulence and before the nancial crisis, LS shocks accounted for a considerable
share of GDP growth in all countries. By taking the absolute value of the contribution (in order to
11The variance decomposition of the remaining variables and the remaining horizons are available upon request.
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focus on the magnitude rather than the sign), it is estimated that the average contribution of LS
shocks to GDP growth is about 0.23 percentage points in 2002-2006, larger than the contribution of
AS shocks (0.14 percentage points) and similar to the contribution of AD shocks (0.26 percentage
points).
Regarding to ination, it is estimated that LS shocks drive ination as much as other shocks,
but its quantitative importance is heterogeneous among countries. In the case of Chile and Peru,
AS shocks are the main driver of ination uctuations, as expected, and LS shocks contribute to
the evolution of ination as much as AD and MP shocks. In Colombia, LS shocks are estimated to
be the main driver of ination uctuations at the beginning of the sample, which can be explained
by a high increase in the loan rate, in turn translating into higher prices during that period. In
subsequent years, LS shocks produced prolonged and large decreases in ination, because LS shocks
made credit inexpensive and caused prices to decrease. In Mexico, most of the increase in ination
in the late 1990s is due to AD shocks and LS shocks. In the following periods, it is estimated that
the reductions in ination below average respond mostly to LS shocks. Particularly, during this
period, the loan rate decreased and the loan volume increased over extended periods; thus, the cost
to rms diminished and prices decreased for many periods.
The results also suggest that LS shocks have been an important factor driving credit volume
growth. These shocks appear to have had a large negative contribution to loan volume growth
in the period following the Russian and Asian crises, which lingered for several years up to 2005.
A common feature among PA countries is that the net incurrence of liabilities to non-residents
decreased during the above mentioned period, implying that local nancial institutions faced -
nancing restrictions in that period, which might explain the prolonged negative e¤ect. Particularly,
in Peru the prolonged negative e¤ect is explained by the fact that this economy is more dependent
on foreign funds than the other countries. In the following periods, these economies faced favorable
economic outcomes that allowed credit volume to expand. However, in 2009, when the nancial
crisis hit them, the contribution of LS shocks turned negative, accounting for a decline of about -1.5
percentage points in loan volume growth in all countries. This result is associated with the previ-
ously mentioned sudden stops that these countries faced during the nancial crisis. Nevertheless,
the sudden-stop episodes were brief and the LS shocks turned positive in the following quarters in
all countries, although Chile registers negative values in the last part of the sample. The fact that
the negative contribution of LS shocks coincides with sudden capital ow stops is consistent with
Lane and McQuade (2014), who provide empirical evidence of the close link between capital ows
and local credit growth for several advanced and emerging economies.
In the case of the loan rate, it is estimated that the importance of LS shocks for driving loan
rate uctuations varies between periods and countries. During the rst half of the sample for all
countries, LS shocks are estimated to account for a large part of the movements of the loan rate,
as much as the contribution of shocks that arose from the real sector. In the case of Colombia and
Peru, the contribution of LS shocks diminished and loan rate uctuations are mainly driven by AS
and AD shocks. Mexico shows small deviations from the mean, but most of these deviations are
due to LS and MP shocks. On the other hand, all shocks are estimated to contribute similarly to
loan rate uctuations in Chile.
4.2.2 The Impact of Loan Supply Shocks over Time
In order to investigate how the e¤ects of LS shocks have evolved over time, an analysis of the
evolution of the IRF at the time of impact is performed and the results are reported in Table 3
and Figure 7. Table 3 shows results obtained using the t-test, which compares the means, and the
Wilcoxon rank sum test, which compares the median. Specically, the tests are estimated on the
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distributions of IRF at the time of impact for two di¤erent periods in two cases: 1996Q4 against
2006Q1 and 2006Q1 against 2017Q1 for all the countries. Both t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test
indicate that in most cases the e¤ect of LS shocks at the time of impact has signicantly changed
across the periods evaluated.
The gure 7 shows that the power of LS shocks to a¤ect GDP growth has evolved in a heteroge-
neous way among PA countries. In the case of Chile, the e¤ect of LS shocks has increased from the
beginning of the sample until late 2009. This behavior may be explained by the expansion of the
banking sector in this country. For instance, the ratio of banking credit to GDP in Chile was about
42.1% in 1990 and increased to 80.8% in 2016. However, from 2009 onwards, the e¤ect of LS shocks
declines to levels close to those at the beginning of the sample, which may be explained by stock
market development in this country. As a result, funding sources expanded and the participation
of the banking system in lending activities decreased.
In Colombia, the e¤ect of LS shocks on GDP rose during the rst half of the sample. This
behavior can be explained by nancial structure changes in Colombia, evolving from specialized
banking to a mixed banking system where banks are allowed to o¤er multiple services to the private
sector. In this context, banksdirect investment as percentage of their total assets increases, in
turn raising the importance of banks in real activity. However, in the periods following 2005, the
e¤ect of LS shocks decreases slightly and then remains stable around 0.9%. Particularly, after 2005,
banksdirect investment decreases and portfolio investment rises, which can explain the consequent
evolution of the impact of the shock.
Regarding Mexico, the impact of LS shocks on real economic activity shows a gradually increas-
ing behavior from 1996 to 2011. This progressive increase can be explained by the reprivatization
of nancial entities implemented after 1994 as an e¤ort to reconstruct the banking system. Nev-
ertheless, from 2012 onwards, the e¤ect of LS shocks decreases. A possible explanation is that
agents in Mexico employ multiple sources of credit in addition to commercial banks. Particularly
in Mexico, 79.5% of enterprises (on average in 2011-2017) reported to be nanced by credit from
suppliers, while 36.1% also reported to be nanced by the banking sector, which could indicate
that the participation of suppliers in real economic activity is as important as that of the banking
system.
In Peru, the impact of LS shocks shows an increasing pattern during the rst part of the sample.
During this period, the country experienced a nancial liberalization process that resulted in an
increase in capital inows for banking activities. As a consequence, banking expansion translated
into an increase in the impact of LS shocks on real economic activity. However, after 2000, the
e¤ect began to decline as a result of the Asian and Russian crises, which caused a severe sudden
stop in the economy. The result from this event is that 15 nancial institutions went bankrupt
between 1998 and 2001. Later, in the periods following 2006, the banking sector recovered and the
e¤ect of LS shocks increased to a range around 0.94%.
4.2.3 Di¤erent Specications of Economic Activity
LS shocks may exhibit di¤erent e¤ects depending on the measure of real economic activity. For
instance, the impact of LS shocks could be greater on non-primary activities than on primary
activities, since non-primary activities, such as trade and services, are mainly nanced by banks.
Moreover, the e¤ect may be stronger on domestic demand than on total GDP, as domestic demand
excludes the foreign component.
In order to assess these quantitative di¤erences in economic activity, the model is re-estimated
for non-primary activities and for domestic demand. Regarding the analysis of non-primary GDP,
the activities considered as non-primary GDP are manufacturing, electricity, water supply, construc-
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tion, trade, and services. The components of domestic demand are private consumption, private
investment, government consumption, and government investment. The results of both cases are
presented in Figure 8. The estimation indicates that the e¤ect of LS shocks over non-primary
activities is quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the case of total GDP for all countries. The
explanation for this result may be associated with the share of non-primary activities over total
GDP (about 80% in all PA countries), which means that both specications are closely related.
On the other hand, the e¤ect on domestic demand is stronger that the e¤ect on total GDP
in all cases, although the magnitude varies across countries. In Chile and Peru, the impact of LS
shocks over the economic activity increased by 0.45 percentage points, compared with around 0.15
percentage points in Mexico and Colombia. These remarkable di¤erences can be explained by the
structure of the trade balance in PA countries. In general, the trade balance has an important weight
in the GDP of these countries, and exports are an important income source. However, their exports
have di¤erent structures, which can explain the di¤erences. Regarding the rst group, exports are
mainly based on mining commodities, with capital markets as the main nancing source. Thus, by
excluding the trade balance and focusing only on domestic demand, enterprises nanced by sources
other than the banking system are excluded; thus, the impact of credit supply shocks increases
considerably. In the second group, exports are not as concentrated on mineral commodities as in
the previous cases. As a result, by excluding the trade balance from the analysis, the e¤ect of rms
nanced by other sources di¤erent from nancial intermediaries is partially isolated. Therefore,
focusing the analysis only on domestic demand for Colombia and Mexico produces an increase in
the impact of LS shocks but not as high as in the case of Chile and Peru.
4.3 Remaining Shocks
Average non-normalized IRFs of AD, AS, and MP shocks are presented in Figure 9, Figure 10, and
Figure 11, respectively. On average, an AD shock boosts GDP growth by about 0.2 percentage
points in all countries. A similar situation is observed in the response of ination at the time
of impact. In the case of the interest rate, its response to the AD shock is estimated to be
higher in Chile and Peru. This result indicates that central banks in these countries have a more
restrictive behavior towards ination, which might be explained by the fact that these countries
faced hyperination periods and, as a consequence, adopted a hawkish-oriented behavior. On the
other hand, results of AS shocks show a similar quantitative e¤ect over all variables, but with
broad condence bands. Moreover, it is estimated that the response of the short-term interest
rate is quantitatively close to zero, suggesting that central banks do not react to AS shocks. This
result is explained by the fact that AS shocks have a small e¤ect on GDP growth and ination.
In addition, the result can also be explained by the fact that AS shocks are more di¢ cult to be
observed by the central bank. Finally, the e¤ect of MP shocks on GDP growth and ination, at the
time of impact, is similar among countries. However, after the time of impact, the impulse response
function is di¤erent among countries: MP shocks are more persistent in Colombia and Chile than
in Peru and Mexico.
5 Sensitivity and Limitations
In order to assess the robustness of the previous results, modications are introduced in the baseline
estimation. First, the model is estimated using di¤erent priors specications. The model is then
estimated replacing the SPGSCI by the terms of trade (ToT) of each country. Finally, di¤erent
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sets of sign restrictions are implemented.12
Regarding the rst sensitivity analysis aimed at evaluating if results are determined by data
rather than imposed by the priors specication, two priors sets are used. In the baseline model,
the priors set is k1 = 0:0005; k2 = 0:05, and k3 = 0:5. The second specication consists of a priors
set similar to Primiceri (2005), which are more exible: k1 = 0:0001; k2 = 0:01, and k3 = 0:01.
The third specication is based on a more restrictive set such that k1 = 0:001; k2 = 0:1, and
k3 = 0:1.13 The results from both specications are reported in Figure 12. The estimation of
stochastic volatility, average impulse response, and evolution of impulse response under the new
specications indicates that the results for Mexico and Peru are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar to the baseline model. In the case of Colombia and Chile, the results show some minor
quantitative changes, but no major changes emerge while analyzing the trends of results. This
suggests that the main results are robust to the di¤erent priors specications.
In the second sensitivity analysis, as the baseline model includes the SPGSCI, some idiosyncratic
features of each country associated with external conditions are not captured. For this reason, the
index is replaced by the ToT of each country. For Peru and Mexico, the comparison is made with
the full sample, while for Chile and Colombia the sample is reduced because the ToT of these
countries are not available for the sample of the baseline model. The estimation with the new
variable is presented in Figure 13. The results indicate that stochastic volatility functions are quite
similar in Chile, Mexico and Peru, while it di¤ers for Colombia, but by a small magnitude. A
similar situation is observed in the case of the average impulse response. The only major di¤erence
appears in the evolution of the impulse response function for Peru, where it is estimated to be
higher in recent periods than the baseline model. In general, results do not di¤er much from the
baseline specication that includes the SPGSCI.
The third sensitivity analysis consist of estimating the model using multiple sets of sign re-
strictions for LS shocks. In particular, two additional sets of sign restrictions are used. The rst
set corresponds to the theoretical model by Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) and Gertler and Karadi
(2011). In these models, LS shocks have a positive e¤ect on the short-term interest rate and have
the same e¤ects on the remaining variables. The second set is based on the model by Gerali et
al. (2010) and Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008), who nd that LS shocks drive GDP and ination in
opposite directions and that the response of the short-term interest rate is negative. The results
are presented in Figure 14. In the case of Colombia and Peru, the estimated results are similar
to the baseline model. In contrast, for Mexico the results vary quantitatively across the di¤erent
specications, but qualitatively they look close to the main model. In the case of Chile, the re-
sults from some of the sign restriction sets di¤er substantially for the rst half of the sample, but
thereafter the results tend to resemble the main model.
As can be observed in the baseline model, the response of real economic activity to LS shocks
is restricted to be positive. This may cause the true e¤ect on real economic activity not to be
captured. For that reason, by taking a di¤erent approach from the previous empirical literature,
the response of GDP growth to LS shocks is not restricted. As a result of this identication, the
estimated response might be interpreted as the genuine response. This idea follows the agnostic
12The results of the sensitivity analysis are only presented in terms of stochastic volatility, average impulse response,
and the evolution of the impulse response function at the time of impact. Moreover, the estimation is only presented
for the case of GDP growth. The results for historical decomposition and variance forecast error decomposition,
as well as for ination, the short-term interest rate, credit volume growth, the loan rate, and SPGSCI growth are
available upon request.
13 In the case of Mexico, it is not possible to estimate the last priors specication; thus, the set k1 = 0:003, k2 = 0:1,
and k3 = 0:1 is used, which is closely related to the original case and also captures the objective of estimating the
model with lower priors.
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identication proposed by Uhlig (2005). The estimation is also presented in Figure 14. The results
indicate that even in this agnostic identication, where GDP growth is unrestricted, the response
of real economic activity remains positive and signicant in all PA countries, which reinforces the
idea that LS shocks are an important factor boosting GDP growth.
The sensitivity analysis indicates that the baseline results are robust against multiple speci-
cations. However, some limitations arise in this research. First, the credit variable used is total
credit, including both foreign and local currencies, which were only available at the current ex-
change rate for most countries. In this regards, credit at current exchange rates is used in all cases
for comparison purposes. In this case, it is plausible that LS shock movements may be inuenced
by the exchange rate. Nevertheless, by using total credit at constant exchange rates for Peru, which
is the only one country where this variable is available, the results indicate that no major changes
arise. Second, PA countries are characterized as middle-income economies; thus, most capital goods
are imported, and for this reason credit in foreign currency is important for economic activity. In
this paper, an aggregate credit variable that includes both currencies is used and a disaggregated
analysis of credit in local and foreign currencies is not performed. Third, the variables used in
the estimation are in annual growth terms, except for the short-term interest rate; thus, the long-
run relationships and cointegration are not assessed. Fourth, the analysis is performed only for
unexpected shocks.
6 Conclusions
This research assesses the impact of LS shocks over real economic activity in PA members. The
analyzed countries are characterized by an expanding banking system, which implies that the
dynamics between the real sector and the nancial system has not remained constant. In this
context, the proposed model is a TVP-VAR-SV, which can be suitable for the analyzed countries.
In order to assess the relevance of the time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility in the
model, some tests are performed on the distribution of the parameters for di¤erent periods of the
sample. The tests performed are the trace test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the t-test. The
results from the tests reveal the existence of signicant time variation in the parameters of the
models estimated for each country.
Results from the average impulse response function indicate that LS shocks have a considerable
e¤ect on real economic activity in all PA countries. Regarding the variance decomposition analysis,
LS shocks appear to account for a large share of the variance decomposition of GDP growth in all
cases, about 16% of the total share, which is larger than that of AS shocks and as large as that of AD
shocks. Based on historical decomposition analysis, two important results arise. First, LS shocks
are an important factor driving slowdown periods of GDP growth in all PA countries. In particular,
during the late-1990s crises, LS shocks diminished GDP growth by about -0.67 percentage points
in Chile, Colombia, and Peru, which is associated with the sudden stop of external capital ows
triggered by increased global risk during the Russian and Asian crises. In contrast, in Mexico the
negative e¤ect materialized after 2000. Moreover, in the recent 2008 crisis, it is estimated that
LS disturbances accounted for a signicant reduction of GDP growth in most countries. Chile,
Mexico, and Peru registered the highest negative impacts (about -1.19 percentage points), while
the contribution was lower in Colombia (about -0.36 percentage points). The second important
result is that loan supply shocks have a remarkable role in driving business cycle uctuations, not
only in crisis periods, but also in stability periods. For instance, in 2002-2006, it is estimated that
the average contribution of LS shocks to GDP growth were about 0.23 percentage points, larger
than the contribution of AS shocks and similar to the contribution of AD shocks.
Regarding the analysis of the evolution of LS shocks over time, the results indicate that the
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e¤ect on real economic activity evolves over time. In order to assess if the impulse response
function is di¤erent across time, the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test are performed for
certain periods. The results indicate that the distribution of the impulse response function shows
signicant di¤erences across periods. However, the evolution of the impact is heterogeneous across
countries. In Colombia and Peru the impact is estimated to be higher than in the 1990s, while
in Mexico and Chile the impact increased considerably, but at certain point started to decline to
levels close to the beginning of the sample.
In order to assess the robustness of the baseline results, three sensitivity analyses are applied.
First, the model is estimated with higher and lower priors than the original set. Second, the
SPGSCI is replaced by the ToT of each country. Third, the impulse response function is estimated
with a di¤erent set of sign restrictions. In most specications the results do not di¤er much from
the baseline specication, suggesting that the main results are robust. Moreover, by applying an
agnostic identication and making the response of GDP growth to be unrestricted, the impact of
loan supply shocks remains positive and signicant.
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7 Tables
Table 1. Sign Restrictions
Sign Restrictions Responses of Variables
GDP Ination Loan Volume Loan Rate Short-Term Rate SPGSCI
Aggregate Demand Shock + + NR + + NR
Aggregate Supply Shock +   NR NR NR NR
Monetary Policy Shock     NR NR + NR
Loan Supply Shock + + +   NR NR
Notes: Sign restrictions are imposed on the impact; NR=not restricted.
T-1
Table 2. Testing Time Variation in Coe¢ cients and Volatility
Trace Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov Testa t-testb
B H A B H A
Value 16% 50% 84% 1-2 2-3 1-2 2-3 1-2 2-3 1-2 2-3 1-2 2-3 1-2 2-3
Chile 0.36 6.1 12.2 27.5 41/42 39/42 6/6 6/6 15/15 14/15 39/42 37/42 6/6 5/6 14/15 15/15
Colombia 0.24 1.7 2.6 4.6 39/42 31/42 6/6 6/6 15/15 15/15 34/42 25/42 5/6 6/6 15/15 15/15
Mexico 0.27 1.9 2.9 5.0 39/42 35/42 6/6 6/6 14/15 15/15 38/42 34/42 6/6 6/6 13/15 14/15
Peru 0.17 1.4 2.3 3.8 41/42 32/42 6/6 6/6 13/15 15/15 38/42 30/42 6/6 6/6 13/15 14/15
Notes: The matrix B contains the regression coe¢ cients, the elements of H are the variance of innovations
and A cointains the contemporaneously relations; a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for two samples. It is per-
formed for each elements of B; H and A. The numerator indicates the number of parameters that changed
across the sub-samples according to the test at 0.05 level of signicance. The denominator indicates the total
number of parameters of each matrix; b t-test for two samples. It is performed for each elements of B; H
and A. The numerator indicates the number of parameters that changed across the sub-samples according
to the test at 0.05 level of signicance while the denominator indicates the total number of parameters of
each matrix.
T-2
Table 3. Evolution of the E¤ect of Loan Supply Shock
Country t-tets Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
y  lv lr stir y  lv lr stir
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
Chile = 6=  6=+ 6=  6=+ 6=  6=+ 6=  6=+ 6=  = 6=  6=+ 6=  6=+ 6=  = = 6=+ 6= 
Colombia 6=+ = 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ = 6=  = 6=+ = 6=+ = 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ = = = 6=+ 6= 
Mexico 6=+ 6=  6=+ = 6=+ 6=  6=  = 6=  6=+ 6=+ 6=  6=+ = 6=+ 6=  = = 6=  6=+
Peru = 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ = = 6=  6=+ = 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ 6=+ = = 6=  6=+
Notes: The test are implemented to the 50% percentile of the impulse responses density at the
time of impact h = 1. The variables y; ; lv; lr and stir are the output growth, ination, loan
volume growth, loan rate and short-term interest rate, respectively. The e¤ects on SPGSCI are
omitted. The letters a and b represent the comparison between 1995Q2 vs 2006Q1, and 2006Q1 vs
2017Q1, respectively. Chosen dates are the same for all countries. The symbol 6= means that the
null hypothesis of two samples come from the same distribution is rejected, the positive superscripts
6=+ indicates that the mean (t-tets) or median (Wilcoxon Rank Sum test) has increased signicantly,
while superscripts 6=  indicates the opposite. The symbol = indicates that null hypthotesis is not
rejected. The results are computed at the 0.05 signicance level.
T-3
8 Figures
I. Chile
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
9.5
10
10.5
Lo
g
GDP
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
3.5
4
4.5
Lo
g 
In
de
x
IPC
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
9
10
11
Lo
g
Loan Volume
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
20
30
40
%
Loan Rate
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
%
Short-Term Rate
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
5
5.5
6
6.5
Lo
g
SPGSCI
II. Colombia
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
11.2
11.4
11.6
11.8
Lo
g
GDP
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
3.5
4
4.5
Lo
g 
In
de
x
IPC
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
11
12
Lo
g
Loan Volume
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
40
%
Loan Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
%
Short-Term Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
5
5.5
6
6.5
Lo
g
SPGSCI
III. Mexico
2000 2005 2010 2015
16
16.2
16.4
Lo
g
GDP
2000 2005 2010 2015
3.5
4
4.5
Lo
g 
In
de
x
IPC
2000 2005 2010 2015
13.5
14
14.5
15
Lo
g
Loan Volume
2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
40
50
%
Loan Rate
2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
40
50
%
Short-Term Rate
2000 2005 2010 2015
5
5.5
6
6.5
Lo
g
SPGSCI
IV. Peru
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10.6
10.8
11
11.2
11.4
11.6
Lo
g
GDP
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
3.5
4
4.5
Lo
g 
In
de
x
IPC
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
9
10
11
12
Lo
g
Loan Volume
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
20
40
60
80
100
120
%
Loan Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
40
%
Short-Term Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
5
5.5
6
6.5
Lo
g
SPGSCI
Figure 1. Series in Levels
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Figure 2. Series in Annual Growth Rates
F-2
I. Chile
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2
4
6
8
10
12
%
GDP Growth
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
%
Inflation
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2
4
6
8
%
Loan Volume Growth
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
5
10
15
%
Loan Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
%
Short-Term Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
500
1000
1500
%
SPGSCI Growth
II. Colombia
2000 2005 2010 2015
2
4
6
%
GDP Growth
2000 2005 2010 2015
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
%
Inflation
2000 2005 2010 2015
50
100
150
200
%
Loan Volume Growth
2000 2005 2010 2015
5
10
15
%
Loan Rate
2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
40
50
%
Short-Term Rate
2000 2005 2010 2015
500
1000
1500
%
SPGSCI Growth
III. Mexico
2000 2005 2010 2015
2
4
6
8
%
GDP Growth
2000 2005 2010 2015
0.5
1
1.5
%
Inflation
2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
%
Loan Volume Growth
2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
40
%
Loan Rate
2000 2005 2010 2015
20
40
60
%
Short-Term Rate
2000 2005 2010 2015
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
%
SPGSCI Growth
IV. Peru
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
5
10
15
%
GDP Growth
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
1
2
3
4
5
%
Inflation
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
%
Loan Volume Growth
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2
4
6
8
10
12
%
Loan Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
20
40
60
%
Short-Term Rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
%
SPGSCI Growth
Figure 3. Stochastic Volatility. The Blue lines correspond to the Median of the Distribution while
the Upper and Lower Red lines represent the Condence Intervals that correspond to the 84th
and 16th percentiles, respectively.
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Figure 4. Average Impulse Response to a Loan Supply (LS) Shock. The Blue lines correspond to
the average of the Median corresponding to every moment of time. The Upper and Lower Red
Llnes represent the Condence Intervals that correspond to the 84th and 16th percentiles,
respectively.
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Figure 5. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). The results are the average of the
median variance decomposition at every moment of time. The Blue color represents the
contribution of AD shocks, the Green color represents contribution of AS shocks, the Red color
means contribution of LS shocks, the Yellow color represents contribution of MP shocks and the
Grey color represents the non identifed shocks.
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Figure 5 (continues). Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). The results are the
average of the median variance decomposition at every moment of time. The Blue color represent
the contribution of AD shocks, the Green color represents contribution of AS shocks, the Red
color means contribution of LS shocks, the Yellow color represents contribution of MP shocks, and
the Grey color represents the non identifed shocks.
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Figure 6. Historical Decomposition (HD). The HD is calculated using the estimated parameters
for each specic time. The Blue color represents the contribution of AD shocks, the Green color
represents contribution of AS shocks, the Red color means contribution of LS shocks, the Yellow
color represents contribution of MP shocks, and the Grey color represents the non identifed
shocks.
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Figure 6 (continues). Historical Decomposition (HD). The HD is calculated using the estimated
parameters for each specic time. The Blue color represents the contribution of AD shocks, the
Green color represents contribution of AS shocks, the Red color means contribution of LS shocks,
the Yellow color represents contribution of MP shocks, and the Grey color represents the non
identifed shocks.
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Figure 7. Evolution of Impulse Response to a LS Shock at the time of impact. The results are the
evolution of the Median of distribution of the Impulse Responses at the time of impact. The Blue
lines represent the Median.
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Figure 8. Loan Supply Shocks with di¤erent measures of economic activity. The Blue line
represents the Median of the distribution using GDP (Baseline specication). The red line is the
Median of the distribution using Non-Primary GDP. The Black line is the Median of the
distribution using Domestic Demand.
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Figure 9. Average Impulse Response to an Aggregate Demand Shock. The blue lines corresponds
to the average of median corresponding to every moment of time. The upper and lower red lines
represents the condence intervals that correspond to the 84th and 16th percentiles, respectively.
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Figure 10. Average Impulse Response to an Aggregate Supply Shock. The blue lines corresponds
to the average of median corresponding to every moment of time. The upper and lower red lines
represents the condence intervals that correspond to the 84th and 16th percentiles, respectively.
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Figure 11. Average Impulse Response to a Monetary Policy Shock. The blue lines correspond to
the average of median corresponding to every moment of time. The upper and lower red lines
represents the condence intervals that correspond to the 84th and 16th percentiles, respectively.
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Figure 12. Sensibility 1: Baseline, Higher and Lower priors. The Blue line represents the results
using the Baseline specication. The Red line represents the estimation using higher priors. The
Black line represent the results usig lower priors.
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Figure 13. Sensibility 2: Model including Terms of Trade. The blue line represents the results
using the baseline specication. The red line represents the stimation using terms of trade instead
of using SPGSCI.
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Figure 14. Sensibility 3: Di¤erent Sets of Sign restrictions. The Blue line represents results from
Baseline specication. The Red line represents results using sign restrictions used in Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), both denoted by CW (2010)-GK (2011). The
Black line represents results using sign restrictions used in Gerali et al. (2010) and Atta-Mensah
and Dib (2008), both denoted by GNSS (2010)-AD (2008). The Yellow line represents results
considering an agnostic specication where GDP Growth and Ination responses to LS shocks are
set to be unrestricted.
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9 Data and Sources
The sample period for each country is chosen depending on the availability of loan rate data.
9.1 Chile
9.1.1 Real GDP
Two series at two di¤erent base years are spliced to build a long real GDP series. The rst one
is real GDP at 1986 prices, available from 1990Q1-2001Q3. The second one is real GDP at 2013
prices, available from 1996Q1-2017Q1. A retropolation splicing procedure is performed to obtain
the real GDP series at 2013 prices from 1990Q1 to 2017Q1. Finally, the series is seasonally adjusted
using Census X13.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
9.1.2 Non-Primary Real GDP
The GDP series by economic activities at two di¤erent base years are spliced (retropolation method)
and then added. The rst set is real GDP by economic activity at 1986 prices. Agriculture; Fishing;
Mining; Manufacturing; Electricity and Water Supply; Construction; Retail Trade and Restaurants;
Transport and Communication; Financial Services; Housing Services; Personal Services; Public
Administration and Defense are available for the period from 1990Q1-2001Q3. The second set is
real GDP by economic activity at 2013 prices for the same activities, available for 1996Q1-2017Q1.
The procedure is to splice each series separately and add them. The production of each activity
does not include import tari¤s or value added taxes. The non-primary GDP series is seasonally
adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
9.1.3 Domestic Demand
Real GDP by expenditure components at 2013 prices is used. Two series are spliced in two di¤erent
base years to build a long series of domestic demand. The rst one is GDP at 1986 prices, available
from 1990Q1-2001Q3 and the second one is GDP at 2013 prices, available from 1996Q1-2017Q1.
Both are the sum of total consumption and investment in their respective base years. A retropo-
lation splicing procedure is performed to obtain the series of real domestic demand at 2013 prices
from 1990Q1-2017Q1. Finally, the series is seasonally adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
9.1.4 CPI
Two series at two di¤erent base years are spliced to build the CPI series. The rst one is CPI
(December 2008=100), available from 1990M1-2001M12; and the second one is general CPI (De-
cember 2013=100), available from 2001M12-2017M3. The quarterly CPI series is obtained as a
three-month average.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
9.1.5 Short-Term Interest Rate
The interbank interest rate series is extended backward using the deposit rate. The overnight
interbank interest rate is available from 1996M1-2017M1. The quarterly series is obtained as a
three-month geometric average. To expand the period of analysis, it is extended backward using
the 30- to 90-day deposit rate, available for 1990M1-1995M4. The quarterly deposit rate series
is calculated as a geometric three-month average. Then, it is spliced backward to the interbank
interest rate. The analysis for 1990Q1-2017Q1 is thus carried out. The argument to make this
exercise is that the deposit rate that banks pay to their costumers is closely related to interbank
interest rate in both value and trend.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
A-1
9.1.6 Credit to Private Sector
The series is total credit to the non-nancial private sector, which is sum of credit to households
and credit to rms, both at market prices. The series includes loans in both domestic and foreign
currency. Furthermore, the total credit series covers only the banking sector, not shadow banking.
All series are available for 1990Q1-2017Q1.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
9.1.7 Loan Rate
The loan interest rate that banks charge their costumers is used. The series is obtained as a
geometric average of loan rates at di¤erent periods. The 30- to 90-day loan rate, the 90-day to
1 year loan rate, the1- to 3-year loan rate, and the loan rate for terms longer than 3 years are
used. The loan rate is thus available for 1990M1-2017M3. The quarterly series is calculated as a
three-month geometric average.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
9.1.8 External Factors
The external variables used are the S&P GSCI (Standard & Poors Goldman Sachs Commodity
Index) and the terms of trade (ToT). First, The S&P GSCI index used is a composite index reecting
general price movement levels and ination in the world economy. The components and weights of
the index are Energy (78.65%); Industrial Metals (6.12%); Precious Metals (1.81%); Agriculture
(10.42%); and Livestock (3.01%). The index is available for the analysis period 1990Q1-2017Q1.
Second, the ToT used is calculated as the ratio between export and import prices. Import and
export price series at two di¤erent base years are spliced to obtain the series. The rst are import
and export indexes at 2013 prices, available from 2008Q1-2017Q1 and the second are import and
export indexes at 2003 prices, available from 1996Q1-2011Q3. A retropolation splicing procedure
is performed for each series. The ratio is then calculated to obtain an analysis series from 1996Q1-
2017Q1.
Source: Bloomberg and Central Bank of Chile.
9.2 Colombia
9.2.1 Real GDP
Two GDP series at di¤erent base years are spliced to obtain the complete GDP series. The rst is
GDP at 1994 prices, available from 1994Q1-2007Q4. The second is gross domestic product at 2005
prices, available from 2000Q1-2017Q1. A retropolation splicing procedure is performed to obtain
the real GDP series at 2005 prices from 1994Q1-2017Q1. The data is already seasonally adjusted
using X12 ARIMA.
Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) of Colombia.
9.2.2 Non-Primary Real GDP
The GDP series by economic activity at two di¤erent base years are spliced (retropolation method)
and then added. The rst set is real GDP by economic activity at 1994 prices, available from
1990Q1-2001Q3. The second set is real GDP by economic activity at 2005 prices, available for
1996Q1-2017Q1. The procedure is to splice each series separately and add them. The production
of each activity does not include import tari¤s of value added taxes. Each series are already
seasonally adjusted by DANE with the X12 ARIMA method.
Source: Banco de la República.
9.2.3 Domestic Demand
GDP series by expenditure components at di¤erent base years are used. The rst set is a GDP
series at 1994 prices for 1994Q1-2007Q4. The second set is a GDP series at 2005 prices for 2000Q1-
2017Q1. A retropolation splicing procedure is performed to obtain the series from 1994Q1-2017Q1
at 2005 prices. All series are already seasonally adjusted by DANE with the X12 ARIMA method.
Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) of Colombia.
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9.2.4 CPI
The consumer price index (2008=100) is used. The period available is from 1990M1-2017M3. The
quarterly series is calculated as a three-month average.
Source: Banco de la República.
9.2.5 Short-Term Interest Rate
The money market rate series is extended backward using the deposit rate. A money market rate
series is available from 1995M3-2017M3. The quarterly series is obtained as a geometric three-month
average. To series is extended backward using a 90-day deposit rate series available from 1994M1-
1995M2. The quarterly deposit rate series is calculated as a three-month geometric average. Then
it is spliced backward to the money market rate to complete the period. This exercise is plausible,
given that both series have common trends and values.
Source: International Monetary Fund and Banco de la República.
9.2.6 Credit to Private Sector
The series is total domestic credit to the non-nancial private sector, which includes credit to
households and credit to rms, both at market prices. The series includes both loans in domestic
and foreign currencies. In the case of total credit, it covers only the banking sector, not shadow
banking. The period available is 1994M1-2017M1. The quarterly series is calculated as a three-
month average.
Source: Bank of International Settlements and Banco de la República.
9.2.7 Loan Rate
It is a weighted average of the rate charged by depository corporations on commercial, ordinary,
short-term (Treasury), and long-term preferential loans. The weights are established according to
loan amounts. The period available is 1994Q1-2017Q1. The quarterly series is calculated as a
three-month geometric average.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
9.2.8 External Factors
Same as 1.8.
Source: Bloomberg and Banco de la República.
9.3 Mexico
9.3.1 Real GDP
The GDP at 2008 prices is used for the period from 1993Q3 to 2017Q1. The series is seasonally
adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).
9.3.2 Non-Primary Real GDP
The GDP series by economic activity at 2008 prices are added to obtain primary and non-primary
GDP series for 1993Q3-2017Q1. The series of economic activities do not include value added taxes.
The non-primary GDP series is seasonally adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).
9.3.3 Domestic Demand
The GDP series by expenditure components at 2008 prices is used for 1993Q3-2017Q1. The series
is seasonally adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).
A-3
9.3.4 CPI
A national consumer price index (NCPI) is available (December 2008=100) for 1993M1-2017M3.
The quarterly series is obtained as a three-month average.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).
9.3.5 Short-Term Interest Rate
The money market rate is used. It is calculated as the weighted average rate on loans between
nancial corporations. The rate is weighted by daily loan amounts. The period used is from
1993M3-2017M1 and the quarterly series are obtained as a three-month geometric average.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
9.3.6 Credit to Private Sector
The series is total credit to the non-nancial private sector at market prices. The credit series
includes loans in both domestic and foreign currency only for the banking sector, not shadow
banking. The period available is from 1994M12-2017M1. The quarterly series is obtained as a three-
month average. Since the credit series is not available prior to 1994Q4, it is extended backward
using a banking credit series provided by the Bank of International Settlements for 1993Q3-1994Q3.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) and Bank of International Settle-
ments.
9.3.7 Loan Rate
The loan rate is approximated with the loan rate on commercial papers to companies. The available
period is 1993M9-2017M3. The quarterly series is calculated as a three-month geometric average.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
9.3.8 External Factors
Same as 1.8.
9.4 Peru
9.4.1 Real GDP
A GDP series at 2007 prices is used for the period from 1993Q2-2017Q1. The series is seasonally
adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
9.4.2 Non-Primary Real GDP
The GDP series by economic activity at 2007 prices are added for 1993Q2-2017Q1. The non-primary
GDP series is seasonally adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
9.4.3 Domestic Demand
The GDP series by expenditure components at 2007 prices is used for the period 1992Q2-2017Q1.
The series is seasonally adjusted using Census X13.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
9.4.4 CPI
The consumer price index (2009=100) is used. The period used is 1992M4-2017M3. The quarterly
series is obtained a three-month average.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
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9.4.5 Short-Term Interest Rate
The average interbank interest rate and the interest rate of BCRP deposit certicates. The inter-
bank interest rate series is available from 1995M11-2017M3. The quarterly series is obtained as a
three-month geometric average. To expand the series, it its extended backward using the interest
rate of BCRP deposit certicates available from 1992M4-1995M10. The quarterly series of interest
rate of BCRP deposit certicates is calculated as a three-month geometric average. Then it is
spliced backward to the average interbank interest rate. The argument to make this exercise is that
the purpose of BCRP deposit certicates is to provide liquidity to the market; thus the interest
rate of deposit certicates approximates the interbank interest rate.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
9.4.6 Credit to Private Sector
The series is total credit to the non-nancial private sector at market prices. The credit series
includes loans in both domestic and foreign currency. The credit series only covers the banking
sector, not deposit companies or other types of nancial intermediaries. The total credit series is
available for 1992M4-2017M3 and the quarterly series is obtained as a three-month average.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
9.4.7 Loan Rate
The average loan rate that banks charge their costumers is used. It is calculated as the average
of the interest rate for overdrafts on current accounts, credit cards, loans, and housing loans. It
is available from 1992M2-2017M3. The quarterly series is calculated as a three-month geometric
average.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
9.4.8 External Factors
Same as 1.8.
Source: Bloomberg and Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
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